This paper investigates the presence of a network externality which might explain the persistence of low schooling achievements among internal migrants. A simple analytical framework is presented to show how an initial human capital disparity between migrants and non migrants can translate into persistent skill inequality if origin shapes the composition of social networks. We test empirically whether young migrants'schooling decisions are a¤ected by the presence of covillagers at destination, using data on life-time histories of migration and education choices from a rural region of Thailand. Di¤erent modelling approaches are used to account for the self-selection of young migrants, for potential endogeneity of the network size, and for unobserved heterogeneity in individual preferences. The size of the migrant network is found to negatively a¤ect the propensity of young migrants to pursue schooling while in the city. This …nding suggests that policies seeking to minimising strati…cation in enclaves might have a socially multiplied impact on schooling participation, and, ultimately, a¤ect the socio-economic mobility of the rural born.
Introduction
"Human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital" Robert E. Lucas (1989) "People in the city and people in the village aren't the same. City people, Bangkok people, you can't trust them, they only think of themselves. In the city people don't know each other.
I've lived in this room for many months now and I still don't know the neighbors. In the village I know everyone. We grow up together, we're all relatives and friends together. I know where they come from, their background. I can trust them." Daeng, a 20-year-old textile operative quoted in Mills (1997) Disparities in growth between urban and rural areas, as well as reduction in migration costs, act as powerful pull factors augmenting the demographic pressures on overcrowded cities of developing countries. It is tempting to assert that the access to more remunerative employment opportunities in urban agglomerates increases the expected returns on education and therefore acts as an incentive to invest in human capital for those planning to migrate. However, young migrants take the decision to pursue schooling beyond a literacy level jointly with their family and in ‡uenced by the broader social network they belong to. It is increasingly recognized that di¤erences in the composition and exclusion mechanisms of these networks a¤ect opportunity costs of higher education.
Economic research on network e¤ects and welfare of the migrant population has produced contrasting results. One strand of the literature emphasizes that the reliance of migrants on origin-speci…c social capital can be associated with a lower rate of assimilation of destinationspeci…c skills. Among others, Borjas (1995) has shown that ethnic neighborhoods have detrimental e¤ects on the educational attainment of migrants in the US. A competing hypothesis is that ethnic or origin-based concentration of migrants is a source of opportunities for gainful interactions in the labor market, for example by disseminating information on job opportunities. Banerjee (1983) 's research on rural-urban migration in India documents extensively the importance of networks of covillagers for explaining migration ‡ows, success of initial job search, and duration of urban employment. With evidence in support of both positive and negative e¤ects, it is unclear how segmentation along enclaves a¤ects economic performance of migrants. This paper contributes to this literature by testing the hypothesis that migrant networks might act as important externalities in the education process of young migrants, representing a potential determinant of the observed low educational attainments. A simple analytical framework, derived from recent contributions on group inequality (Bowles & Sethi (2006) , Bowles 2 et al. (2008) ), shows how a family living in a disadvantaged community can optimally decide to invest relatively less in schooling when network externalities are in place. In this framework, belonging to the group with the lower average human capital is associated with an higher cost of investment in education; inequality in educational attainment of individuals from di¤erent groups is shown to persist across generations if segregation in enclaves is su¢ ciently high. In our application of this framework to the issue of migrant assimilation, an important innovation is the identi…cation of two mechanisms through which segregation can endogenously emerge. The …rst draws on Benabou (1996) 's research on strati…cation in the urban space, leading migrants to concentrate in neighborhoods less favorable to human capital investments. The second argues that migrant families care about being accepted among members of their own origin community, and that they might be willing to reduce their investments in human capital to avoid the costs of exclusion.
We test the relevance of this network externality using unique data from Thailand, the Nang Rong Project database. This dataset provides direct individual and family information on both migrants and stayers, through longitudinal surveys in the villages and migrant follow-ups in the main urban destinations. It also includes rich retrospective information on migration and education decisions. We can thus work with a panel data set of individual location decisions and schooling outcomes, from multiple communities and to multiple destinations, over a long period of time. Di¤erently from the majority of contributions in the migration literature, we can take advantage of this balanced representation of migrants and stayers to control for the fact that those choosing to migrate and to join the migrant network at destination are not a random sample of the rural young population.
For the empirical analysis, we follow an approach close to Munshi (2003) ' s, who provides a solid empirical illustration of the positive e¤ects networks can play for labor market outcomes of mexican migrants. His instrumental variable analysis succeeds in controlling for the e¤ects of correlated shocks among migrants from the same origins, using regional random rainfall variation from the area of the migrants to identify the network e¤ects. Di¤erently from Munshi (2003) , we focus on the schooling decision of young internal migrants from the age of 13, as higher education is believed to be an important proxy for social mobility of migrants within the urban labor market 1 . The young migrant's network is measured by the number of sampled individuals in his village who are located at the destination at each point in time. Identi…cation of network e¤ects is based on the fact that each village has a di¤erent history of migration, so that the rural young coming from di¤erent villages rely on di¤erently developed networks of contacts. 1 An increasing number of studies shows the importance of education for migrant assimilation and long-term earning prospects. Yamauchi (2003) , examining wage dynamics of migrants in Bangkok, shows evidence of a complementarity between upon-arrival human capital and labor market experience at destination. His results imply that more-educated migrants have higher learning e¢ ciency and can perform tasks of greater complexity, ultimately yielding higher wage growth in the destination market. In the context of international migration, some important contributions have shown that the source of human capital matters, the one acquired at destination being more rentable on the labor market (see Friedberg (2000) and Eckstein & Weiss (1998)) 3
The aggregation of networks at the tiny village level is another departure from Munshi 2 : data evidence validates this measure as a good approximation of the true composition of the migrant's reference group 3 . We instrument network size by the exogenous source of variation associated with random, ballot-based, assignment of young to the military service. The forced movement to the cities of the rural young balloted to serve in the military tends in fact to be accompanied by increased voluntary migration of these same young and others villagers in later years. Additional instruments for network size are the exposure of the village to rain shocks, and a lagged measure of the incidence of return migration to the village.
The estimates show that a larger network of co-villagers at destination lowers the probability that a young migrant is enrolled in higher schooling. We interpret this result as an indication that social interactions with the "origin" network matter in determining the migrant "long term" pro…le, in terms of willingness to acquire destination-speci…c human capital and, possibly, in terms of the speed at which he is able to converge to natives' performances on the labor market. The robustness of the results is con…rmed when we shift to an alternative multinomial mixed logit approach for the joint migration and education decision, which accounts explicitly for individual heterogeneity.
These results suggest that network e¤ects can act as a driving mechanism of low-mobility traps among migrants, at least in the context of this study. As a result, the important role networks play in facilitating migration and easing life at destination might come at a cost, slowing down the convergence of people of rural origin to the average level of skills of the urban born. Considering the strength of the links migrants keep with their origin villages (by remittances, return episodes and as role models), it cannot be excluded that this network e¤ect on human capital might reinforce persistence in inequality between backward rural areas and dynamic urban poles of developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical framework giving important insights on the potential e¤ects of social networks on educational investments of migrant minorities. Section 3 describes the data and the network measure used.
Section 4 illustrates the econometric analysis and summarizes the results. Section 5 concludes.
Modelling insights from the theory of segregation
To study the implications of segregation for di¤erential human capital accumulation and persistent inequality consider the following setting, based on the theoretical studies of Bowles and 2 We consider this as a signi…cant data advantage, making us more con…dent that we are actually capturing social relations between migrants. On average, each village in our data has a population of less than 600 individuals, much lower than that of a community in the mexican data used by Munshi (2003) . Our network measure is also speci…c to each urban destination, that have a geographical extension much lower than the one of US States in Munshi (2003) .
3 Thai villages were historically fairly tightly bounded social communities and traditional village life was relatively isolated, generating a common community culture and encouraging behavioral conformity (Godley (2001) ). Of course, this static picture is evolving now with the increasing migration ‡ows to the cities.
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Sethi (2006) , and Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008) . Individuals belong to two groups, Natives (N) and Migrants (M), and have a preference for association with individuals of their group, which is de…ned as segregation. There is an imperfect mixing of migrants and natives. This diversity in social network composition translates in di¤erent opportunity costs of human capital accumulation, as an externality is in place linking each training achievement of a young with those of the other agents to which he is tied. Inequality in the allocation of skills between migrants and non migrants is shown to widen and persist in time if segregation is high enough. This result is crucially linked to the assumption of a positive, exogenously given level of segregation.
Drawing on the work of Bénabou (1996) on the role of skill di¤erences in determining residential choices in the urban space, and on the work of Austen-Smith & Fryer (2005) , in which agents care about social acceptance in their own group when taking decision on human capital accumulation, we "endogenize" the networking process, giving us even stronger foundations to the negative link between migrant networks and schooling enrollments observed in the data. This provides the foundation for the empirics, which emphasizes the role of elective participation in social networks, and tries to account for the endogenous development of these networks.
Basic setting
We here follow closely the development and notation in Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008) . Consider a scenario with overlapping generations and families composed by one parent and one child, living in a city for two periods. In the …rst period of life parents can decide to invest in the training of the child, while no human capital accumulation occurs in the second period of life when everyone works for a wage. Time is indexed by t; t = 0; 1:::T . Agents belong by birth to one of two groups V = N; M , the natives of the city N and those of rural origin (migrants and descendents of migrants) M . The proportion of N and M in the total urban population is exogenously given respectively by n and 1 n. Agents are characterised by their skill (human capital) level s, which can take two values, being equal to l if the individual stays unskilled and equal to h if the individual acquires skills when young.
There is a complementarity between high and low skill labor in the process of production. The total output of the city economy in period t is given by the production function q(h t ; l t ), where h t and l t are the proportions of workers employed in high-skill and low-skill jobs, respectively.Let s t denote the proportion of skilled individuals at each period in the overall economy: this is simply a weighted average of s N t and s M t ; the average education levels in the native and in the migrant group, respectively:
The production function q satis…es constant return to scale, diminishing marginal returns to each factor and the conditions lim s!0 q 1 = lim s!1 q 2 = 1.
Competitive …rms assign two levels of wages according to the skill of the worker (w h > w l ):
the wage di¤erential (s t ) is positive and decreasing in s.
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Assume that in the …rst period there is a higher proportion of skilled among adult natives than among adult migrants (s M t < s N t ) : this assumption is not strong if one allows that skills acquired at the rural village are not fully transferable at destination. Each individual's social network is composed by a mix of individuals from one's origin group and from the other group. Suppose, as in Bowles and Sethi (2006) , that a proportion of each agent's social a¢ liates is drawn from his own group of origin, while the remaining 1 is randomly drawn from the overall city population. Denote by L V the mean level of human capital in the social network of an individual belonging to either the native or migrant group. This index of the human capital quality of one's social network depends on the levels of human capital in each one of the two groups and on the extent of segregation ; as follows:
It should be clear that in the absence of perfect integration ( > 0); L M t will be lower than L N t as long as s M t is lower than s N t : Parents fully internalize the preferences of their children with no discounting for the future, so that training is undertaken if the bene…t for the child outweighs the cost for the parent. The cost of training a young in any generation is given by the function c(a t+1 ; L t ); strictly decreasing in both the arguments a, child ability, and L, social network's quality. The distribution of ability is given by the function G(a), with support [0; 1), assumed to be the same across groups. The bene…t of training is simply the wage di¤erential (s t+1 ); which is the same across group, i.e. no explicit labor market discrimination is in place.
Training decisions and persistence in inequality of skills
A threshold level of ability e a can be de…ned for each of two groups in V = N; M , so that only the young of each group who have ability above this threshold are trained. This threshold level, e a t+1 ; is implicitly de…ned by the value of ability satisfying
The following dynamics of human capital accumulation apply to each group:
simply meaning that only those young having ability greater than e a t+1 ( (s t+1 ); L V t ) become skilled workers in period t + 1.
It is clear that increased segregation, by a¤ecting the quality of the social network L V t ; raises the costs of human capital accumulation for the disadvantaged group, the internal migrants, while lowering these costs for the natives.We now aim to show that, given a positive level of segregation and the spillovers in human capital accumulation described above, optimal training decisions of the native and the migrant group can be persistently di¤erent over time.
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De…ne a competitive equilibrium as a sequence of skill allocations across groups f(s N t ; s M t )g 1 t=1 satisfying equations (1-4). The main result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Bowles et al.(2008) The intuition is that an initial situation of skill disadvantage of one group can not be reversed along the equilibrium path, which is unique given an initial state (s N 0 ; s M 0 ). Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008)'s formal proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium path and of persistence of inequality is reproduced in the appendix. The appendix also provides an extensive treatment of steady state behaviour of the model, a steady state being de…ned as an equilibrium in which
The most interesting result concerns the instability of the unique symmetric steady state -symmetric meaning that the additional condition s N t = s M t is satis…ed -if the segregation level and the size of the interpersonal spillover are su¢ ciently high. This indicates that convergence in skill levels among groups is not achievable even in the very long run, group inequality persisting asymptotically.
Extensions accounting for determinants of segregation and network externalities
The model identi…es conditions under which the combined e¤ect of network spillovers in the cost of acquiring human capital and an origin bias in the composition of social networks can be su¢ cient for internal migrants to be locked in a condition of low education achievements. In fact, persistent group inequality can arise even in the absence of discrimination in the labor market, and with equality of opportunity, that would hold if liquidity constraint for education are not binding. This conclusion rules out one-shot redistributive policies as e¤ective instruments for equalization. However, the scenario for policy becomes less somber if one is willing to get rid of the assumption of a level of segregation exogenously given and …xed. Below, we provide intuitions on two possible extensions of the model that endogenize , thereby increasing the scope for policy interventions.
Social segregation and residential enclaving
One potential determinant of origin-biased social networking is the residential segmentation of groups in city space. Think of the utility maximization problem faced by the adult as involving also a location decision among two di¤erent neighborhoods, each parent trading o¤ the bene…t of a better environment for his child's learning with the cost of higher rents. Equilibrium in the city space is an allocation of households across neighbourhoods and rents such that no household prefers a neighborhood di¤erent from its own. Bénabou (1996) proves that this equilibrium will result in location strati…cation (those from one speci…c community preferring to locate in one speci…c neighborhood), if the rich in human capital are able to bid more than the poor 7 for living in the community with a higher endowment of human capital. Formally, Bénabou's sorting condition says that the marginal rate of substitution between the network quality and the rent price increases with the parent level of education. When this sorting condition holds, any divergence from the symmetric initial allocation of skill, s N 0 = s M 0 ; sets in motion a cumulative process with skilled (higher income) people outbidding unskilled (lower income) people for the privilege of locating close to other skilled (higher income) people. This process ends when at least one neighborhood is completely homogeneous. At least three distinct determinants of segregation can be identi…ed by extending the model so as to account for spatial segmentation à la Bénabou: a) complementarities between family human capital and community quality; b) imperfections in capital markets resulting in the poor having a relatively higher opportunity cost of borrowing; c) di¤erences in family life time resources 4 . Segregation in the city space is a variable that can be a¤ected by policy: di¤erentiated taxes and subsidies can be e¤ective in reallocating families across communities (Bénabou, 1996) , and urban regeneration programs can raise the attractiveness of neighborhoods where there is an historically higher concentration of migrants 5 .
A "social signalling" e¤ect?
As spatial and social proximity are likely to be correlated, the allocation of individuals in strati…ed neighborhoods can alone generate segmentation. Other mechanisms can explain why a migrant can rationally prefer to maintain segregated social relations. We have in mind a scenario in which the young derive utility from being part of his origin group and admission to the group is selective. It seems reasonable to assume that migrants can diverge in the value they assign to group participation, and that the migrant community might preserve its cohesion by excluding families signalling little interest in participation by "deviant" behaviours. One of these behaviours can be an investment in the schooling progression of the young which is believed excessive by the group 6 .
Austen-Smith and Fryers (2005) develop a two-audience signalling model in order to explain 4 Complementarity here simply means that families with higher human capital are more sensitive to neighborhood quality than those with lower levels of human wealth.We refer to Bénabou (1996) for a detailed explanation of these determinants of the segregation process. The original model of Bénabou allows for another determinant of strati…cation, the level of decentralised expenditures in education …nanced through taxes on the local population. Basically, familiar and public inputs determine together the neighborhood-speci…c, per-student budget. Obvious complementarities between parental human capital and local public expenditures on education supply are enough to make the integrated equilibrium unstable (Bénabou, 1996) .the phenomenon of "acting white", according to which young blacks in the US make a low e¤ort in school as they are exposed to peer pressure condamning behaviors perceived to be characteristic of whites. As in their model, a network e¤ect on training attainments can emerge in our framework if the market and the social network value di¤erently an educational investment of a young migrant. Add then the assumption that each individual migrant's type is de…ned by a pair, = ( ; ), where is intrinsic ability as above and is the individual's social type (his innate compatibility with his own community) which takes two values, high or low, and is only privately observed 7 . Individuals have an interest in being accepted members of their community: assume, for simplicity, that utility of time not spent acquiring education is augmented by a factor ( ) if one is accepted by his origin community. The migrant network, being imperfectly informed about the individual's attachment to his origin community (if the individual social type is high or low), can interpret an investment in destination speci…c human capital as a signal of divergence and sanction it with exclusion from community life 8 . In the framework above, no change occurs for the native group. However, for the migrant group, the rate of preference for origin-biased networking is now di¤erent from zero only for an endogenously de…ned subset of individuals for whom the utility value of group participation outweighs the costs in terms of wage income foregone. The threshold ability level e a; needed by these individuals to be trained, increases with respect to the scenario with no need for social signalling. When the social type is private knowledge then, con ‡icting incentives to invest in destination speci…c human capital and to signal loyalty to the group can be a channel through which historical group di¤erences in human capital levels spill over into next generation's investment behaviour.
Anything altering the trade-o¤ between income gains and value of group participation will a¤ect the incidence of the network externality. For example, a productivity shift raising the wages perceived by the migrants on the market would raise the opportunity costs of community participation and lower the proportion of those willing to sacri…ce education for group acceptance. In the other direction, access to a larger community at destination can be expected to increase the value of group participation, and thus the relevance of the externality on individual schooling decisions. 7 In another class of models, incomplete information plays a role in education decisions via information costs. In this case it can be rational to use the action of others as a signal instead of acquiring own information (see Streufert (2000) ).
8 The group is assumed to have interest only on individuals whose social type is high, having no direct concerns with such types' educational levels. In Austen Smith and Fryers (2005) model, this is formalized by assuming a …xed, non negative, payo¤ for the group from rejecting any individual. This anthropomorphization of the community group is consistent with other studies on social networking and under-development traps. Ho¤ & Sen (2005) show that control mechanisms at disposal of the peer network can generate a poverty trap when economic opportunities outside the origin community widen. An interesting study by Munshi & Rosenzweig (2003) , with survey data from Bombay, shows tha networks of lower caste male channel boys into local language schools leading to traditional occupations, despite the substantial rise of returns to nontraditional occupations.
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3 Nang Rong data and network measures
The model above predicts a direct relation between the weight of people from one's origin group in the social network and individual human capital achievements. A higher network size increases the likelihood of interactions with people from one's origin community and it is thus expected to be positively correlated with the segregation index : If a "social signalling" e¤ect exists, it is likely to reinforce the externality in the cost of education, as social contacts will matter more as determinants of similar behaviours within a group. We test the empirical relevance of this network e¤ect for education decisions of young migrants using data on rural-urban migration from Thailand. The Thai economy experienced a rapid development process in the period under study, with an average growth rate of real GNP per capita of 5.7% per year between 1976 and 1996. However, there are concerns over the growing rural-urban divide in the same period, as the income Gini coe¢ cient passed from 0.436 in 1976 to 0.515 in 1996, a level even higher than the average one for Latin America and the Caribbean in the same year (Jeong (n.d.) ).
The data come from a collection of research surveys of social, economic and environmental change in the district of Nang Rong, historically one of the least-developed parts of Thailand.
The Nang Rong project dataset consists of three waves of data collection -for the years 1984, 1994, 2000 . A migrant follow-up survey was added to track a sample of migrants who had gone to one of the four following urban destinations: (1) metropolitan Bangkok, (2) the Eastern Seaboard, a highly dynamic area comprising the two urban centers of Rayong and Chonbury, (3) Korat, an important regional pole, and (4) Buriram, the provincial capital. The 2000 round builds on the previous data collection e¤orts incorporating a geo-spatial component in addition to the community, household and migrant follow-up surveys. Moreover, the 1994 and 2000 surveys undertook the innovative task to identify both social and kinship networks among the residents, households and villages of Nang Rong. These ties are measured directly through kinship, labor exchanges, and agricultural equipment exchanges.
In the estimations, we mainly exploit the life history sections of the 2000 data, collected on the sample of individuals who are resident in Nang Rong at the time of the survey, and on the sample of those residing in one of the major urban destination at that time. Life history, or retrospective, data provide long-term information on migration and schooling choices, yielding an unbalanced panel with a minimum of one observation for those aged 13-year-old in 2000, to a maximum of 13 observations for those aged 25-year-old or older in 2000. The analysis thus extends to multiple cohorts of individuals, and cover a period of more than 30 years. As mentioned in the introduction, the most salient aspect of these data comes from the merging of information on migrants and non migrants, which provides a picture of the rural community not bounded by the rural district and thus closer to its true, geographically mobile, con…guration.
Previous empirical research on migration has often su¤ered from a deep selection problem, limiting the observation to those who are migrants at a given point in time. The fact that these migrants are not a random sample of the origin population bias inference, selectivity occurring 10 along many and mostly unobserved characteristics 9 . Other research on migration and source communities has asked origin families to provide information on migrated members: there are limits to the level of detail and to the quality of this indirect information. Of course, quality is an issue also for retrospective data. There are reasons to suspect recall bias especially concerning individuals who are older at the time of the 2000 survey, and thus have to reconstruct how they behave in a distant past. However, Nang Rong surveys provide an opportunity to examine data quality because they contain repeated retrospective histories undertaken in two points in time, in 1994 and in 2000; a simple check of the matching of information provided by a subset of individuals present in both survey con…rm that quality is quite high 10 . Moreover, there is evidence that events that are highly salient to the respondent, like schooling and migration decisions, are better recalled (Beckett et al. (1999) ) 11 .
Network size (N et in the equations which follow) is de…ned by counting, for each young individual and each year, the number of co-villagers present at destination the year before 12 . Excluded from the count are migration episodes due to serving in the military service or as a monk.
The network measure is thus time varying, and speci…c to each couple of village-destination. As already said, we assume that the village is the most relevant agora shaping social interactions outside the family, ruling out the progressive integration among villages through trade, sharing of equipment, and, most relevantly, seasonal mobility of laborers. I also exclude the migrated members of the family from the count of the network size assigned to each individual-year, as I am mainly interested in testing the e¤ect of acquiantances and transitory social relations.
INSERT TABLE 2 "Descriptive Statistics" HERE In table 2, descriptive statistics are provided on adults residing in Nang Rong (column 1), all the migrants (column 2), and disaggregated by destination. A quick overview suggests some interesting patterns. There is no big di¤erence in internal migration behaviour of women and men: the only destination where male migrants are predominant is Khorat. The average level of education of parents is slightly higher for migrants than for non migrants, as well as the migrants' mean educational attainment. The average size of the migrant stock tends to be considerably higher, as expected, in traditional destinations, such as Bangkok and the provincial capital of Buriram, with respect to new emerging poles, such as cities in the Eastern Seaboard. At their …rst migration, movers rely on an extensive support from their communities, ranging from hospitality (three out of four go and live with others they know), to help for …nding a job or for setting an enterpreneurial activity (61% received this kind of help). Migrants are also highly successful in …nding a job at destination within one month from their arrival, and they rather move with friends or family. The last variables in the table give an interesting snapshot of the extent of origin bias in social interactions. The whole pool of migrants reveal that, at the timing of their …rst move, around 62% of their neighbours -people living between 100 meters where they lived -came from the region of Isan, where Nang Rong is located. This percentage lowers only to 60% when migrants are asked about their location at the year of the survey, 2000. Considering that between the year of the …rst move and the year 2000 there is an average interval of 11 years, this seems to indicate that residential mixing does not occur in our sample. Statistics on the origin of friends at destination, at the bottom of the table, give similar indications.
A legitimate concern is that our speci…c measure of network size at the village level might not capture well e¤ective social network use by the migrants. In table 3, we undertake a simple experiment to validate our network measure. Using the 2000 sample of migrants, we inspect whether a positive correlation exists between network size and the preference for members of one's own origin network as sources of help. Migrants are asked to identify the person outside their family to which they would ask in the hypothetical situation of money problems. We run a regression linking the probability that this person is someone from the origin village of the migrant to the village-destination speci…c network size in 1999 and a set of controls. The highly statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient associated with network size gives further indications that the village of origin matters for migrants'social relations. Moreover, variations in size of origin based networks seem to be associated with variations in the importance of this informal institution for internal migrants.
INSERT TABLE 3 "Validating the network measure" HERE Table 4 diplays a transition matrix including data from the sample used in all the estimations, including all the young individuals whose mobility and study choices are observed when they had an age between 13 and 25. It shows the number of cases -a case corrisponding to the individual-year pair-in which we observe a transition along one of the four following states: stay in Nang Rong and work, stay in Nang Rong and study, having migrated to an urban destination and work, having migrated and study. It can be seen that the sample has a fairly balanced representation of migrants and non migrants. Simply spotting the number of unchanged states on the diagonal of the matrix, one can see that there is a relatively higher number of cases of individuals studying as residents at Nang Rong than as migrants, suggesting the possibility of a schooling dispersion associated to migration.
INSERT TABLE 4 "Transition matrix for the joint schooling mobility choice" HERE 12
Econometric models and results
The econometric identi…cation of causal e¤ects of networks on education outcomes poses complex problems. As emphasized by Manski (1993) , the fundamental problem with the research on social interactions is the necessity to control for correlated unobserved e¤ects within the community.
The empirical literature has followed di¤erent avenues for tackling confounding factors associated with omitted common variables, simultaneity or reverse causality and selection or sorting.
Here we present three modelling approaches aimed to tackle the challenges of sample selection into migration, endogeneity of changes in network characteristics, and omitted variable bias due to unobserved individual preferences for migration and schooling. The …rst method corrects selection bias by modelling, as a …rst stage, the endogenous choice of moving to the city. The second method tackles the potential endogeneity of network size in the young school enrollment by instrumenting networks through the exogenous variations in the number of twenty years old males balloted to serve in the military service and two additional instruments. As will become clear, these two approaches, based on standard non-linear binary choice models, are complementary. The third approach proposes a multinomial formulation of the problem, which explicitly controls for selection in migration status and unobserved heterogeneity. This third approach yields results broadly consistent with those obtained using the binary choice formulation.
Estimation of network e¤ects corrected for migrant selection
We are interested in the education decision of the young once he has reached an urban destination 13 . The critical assumption for identi…cation of migrant network e¤ects on this decision is that the ‡ow of young moving from rural to urban areas is sorted into groups according to their village of origin. This sorting is however far from being a random assignment from the whole pool of rural young. The availability of data on migrants and non migrants allows to model explicitly the choice of migration as a pre-requisite for participation in group interactions. By controlling for the non randomness of the migration choice, we correct sample selection and we also aim to reduce the bias associated with non-random sorting into migrant networks, in essence leading to a simultaneous selection of migration destination and associated networks. Because of the dichotomy of the enrollment variable, treating the data as a pooled cross section, I follow here Van de Ven & Van Praag (1981) , whose probit sample selection model is an extension of the Heckman (1979)'s selection model for dichotomous outcome variables.
The binary enrollment equation for a young migrant i can be expressed in latent terms as follows: IN 2000) , the number of younger siblings (SIBLING), the average education of the parents (PARENTAL EDUCATION), origin family wealth (ASSET SCORE), the availability of an high school at the origin village (SCHOOL), whether more than a language is spoken at home (LANGUAGE), age dummies, origin village and city destination …xed e¤ects, time controls and a constant term. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed:
Assume a reservation destination exists for each individual. This latent variable, expressing the expected utility gain from migrating, can be expressed as:
the vector R i includes the control variables in X i ; the total number of migrants from a village with one year lag (TOTAL NETWORK), a constant term and the following variables selected as exclusion restrictions: the distance of the origin village from the main road to Nang Rong (ROAD LENGHT), a measure of family migration experience (FAMILY MIGRATION), and a family level measure of exposure to rain shocks at the origin (RAIN). Table 1 de…nes how these variables have been constructed: however, a brief explanation can be useful here to clarify the identi…cation strategy. The distance of the village from the main road is expected to be negatively correlated with habitants' capacity to leave. Information and moving cost of migration are expected to decrease with family previous migration experience. As shown in other studies of migration from rural areas in developing countries 14 , scarce rains represent a serious shock to agricultural production -the culture of rice in this context -which can induce further migration. Given that there is only one meteo station collecting rain data for the whole Nang Rong region, the exposure index has been built by interacting the average yearly volume of rain in the district with the time investment of family members in agricultural activities 15 .
The error term in this selection equation is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution,
The population regression function in (5), for the subsample of migrants, can be stated as:
the parametric assumption of the model is the bivariate standard normal distribution of " i1
and " i2 , with correlation coe¢ cient : With this assumption, the error term in the outcome equation has the following conditional distribution:
(R i t) ; and ; are respectively the standard normal density and cumulative distribution.
As shown by Heckman (1979) , the inverse Mill's ratio term is a control function that we need to add to the outcome equation (5), in order to estimate consistenty the parameters :
The likelihood function on the subsample of migrants, after accounting for selection, can be written as:
and can be consistently estimated using the Heckman two step procedure, or by a full maximum likelihood approach. 16 Given we are using pooled data with t observations for each individual, we need to cor- (column 1); this negative impact is con…rmed when we control for origin village …xed e¤ects (column 2). The magnitude of this impact is however small. Considering the speci…cation with village …xed e¤ects, the probability of enrollment decreases of 1.3% with one standard deviation change (3.3 in this sample) change in the network size.
As can be seen, there is no evidence of gender e¤ects either on the propensity to pursue higher schooling or to migrate when young. Having educated parents raises the odds of being enrolled in school after the age of 13, while having no apparent e¤ect on the probability of migrating internally. Having an higher number of younger brothers and sisters does not a¤ect schooling:
educational choice does not seem to depend, in this context, on competition for scarse resources among siblings, as we would expect in a context where schooling costs are high relatively to household income and credit constraints exist. Coming from a larger family seems to positively a¤ect the willingness to migrate. Speaking more than one language at home has no signi…cant e¤ects on schooling, while it is positively correlated with migration propensity: no univocal causal relation can be established here, since the fact of speaking more than one language at home can be associated with a family history of migration or interethnic marriages. In order to control for family wealth while reducing evident endogeneity concerns, I build a principal component measure of family long term income, condensing information on twelve productive and non productive assets: this wealth measure has a signi…cant, positive explanatory power on the odds of enrollment, while being negatively associated with migration. With respect to those migrating to Bangkok, enrollment rates are higher for young who moved to Buriram (the regional capital), or to Khorat, while are sensibly lower for those choosing to migrate to the Eastern Seabord. As for the variables excluded for identi…cation reasons, we observe that the overall migration investment of the village (obtained by counting together migrants from the village present in all the destinations with one year lag) is an highly relevant predictor of individual migration. The cumulated number of years of working experience outside Nang Rong of family members not in the sample (who are 40 years old or older), is another important explanatory factor of young migration. Rain shocks act as an important push factor for individual migration from a region where the colture of rice is still the main economic activity 18 . Villages with more di¢ cult access to the Nang Rong town (as measured by distance to the major highway) tend to have a lower participation in migration.
Instrumental variable estimation of network e¤ects
Instrumental variable estimation (IVE) is a powerful tool for dealing with three variations of the same statistical problem: measurement error, simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias. Essentially, all the three problems challenge the consistency of the model, pointing to the possibility that the network size regressor can be correlated with unobserved determinants of enrollment choice. Measurement error is an issue, since we dispose of an imperfect proxy of the true size of the network from the origin community: given that villages are not isolated one from the other, and that solidarity or mutual recognition can link individuals at an higher level than the village 19 , it is possible that our measure is downwardly biased. Simultaneity bias can be a further threat to the consistency of network e¤ect estimation. The choice of youngster to be enrolled in school can be internalized by the community, which might then transfer information on job opportunities in the city to those who are still in the village; by this mechanism network size might not only cause but also be in ‡uenced by schooling behaviour. Finally, omitted variable bias is probably the greatest source of concern, since we are not able to control for the full set For what concerns rainfall shocks, as already said there is only one weather station in Nang Rong, so we only dispose of rainfall variation over time, not villages: the village level measure is built by interacting the level of rainfall with the village-level average time investment in agriculture. The exogeneity of this second instrument can be reasonably assumed if we think that shocks at the origin village have no other impact on schooling choices of young migrants existing in Thailand among people from the same village, I choose not to depart from the assumption that the village is the relevant bound for de…ning network size. 2 0 Conscription was introduced in Thailand shortly after the First World War. In the 80s and 90s the recruitment system increasingly became subject to public debate. Obviously the system was likely to lead to favoritism on the hands of in ‡uential or rich people. I expect this favoritism to be less pronounced within the less developed rural areas of Nang Rong, and thus that young villagers had to face more or less the same risk of being recruited for the military. See the military recruitment dataset at: http://leavwww.army.mil/fmso/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf apart from altering the size of their relevant network 21 .
The last instrument is a count of episodes of return from each destination to the origin village: the relevance of this instrument is straightforward, as substantial episodes of return are observable in the dataset once the village starts to have a relevant migration history. I use a two-year lagged value of this return variable to reduce the threat to validity represented by unobserved factors or shocks likely to a¤ect both village level return behaviour and individual schooling decisions.
The system of equation to be estimated can be expressed as:
where
with X i being the usual set of controls and d N et i being the …tted values from the network instrumented equation (11)
The instruments in the vector Z i are expected to satisfy the requirements of exogeneity and relevance.
The log likelihood for observation i is:
with
The model is estimated using the IVProbit procedure in Stata which implements Amemiya's generalized least square estimator (Amemiya (1978) ; Newey (1987) ), jointly estimating equations (10) and (11) INSERT TABLE 6 "IV Estimation of network e¤ects on schooling enrolment" HERE Results are displayed in table 6. The models in column 1 to 3 are three di¤erent speci…cations of the Amemiya-Newey instrumental variable probit model, where the instruments used are enrolment in the military, rain intensity and return episodes. In the second column, we control for village …xed e¤ects, while in the third we add, as an additional group level regressor, the average level of education of the network's population. In all the three speci…cations, network size enters as a negative and signi…cant determinant of schooling enrolment: there is thus support for the hypothesis that young individuals, when migrating, have a lower propensity to acquire an higher level of education if they are part of a large enclave. The magnitude of the impact becomes higher when network size is instrumented, a one standard deviation change in network size corrisponding to a decrease in the probability of enrollment of 6.6% (for speci…cation in column 2). It is interesting to observe that the size of the e¤ect increases when using instruments, as we suspected given that unobservable preferences for social interactions with one's origin group can magnify the externality and a measurement error in the network size could attenuate the non-IV estimates.
Regarding the instrumental variables, the lagged number of drafted soldiers is strongly correlated with the size of the network in all the speci…cations. Rain intensity, as expected, reduces out-migration from the village, even if its statistical signi…cance is reduced when we add village …xed e¤ects to the model speci…cation. The number of episodes of return at period t 1 are an highly signi…cant and positive predictor of the stock of migrants at any destination at period t.
Column 5 of table 6 is an attempt of estimating network e¤ects on schooling choice making a simultaneous use of instrumental variables and of the Heckman type correction for selection into migration. This is done by simply adding, as an extra regressor in the IV model, the inverse Mill's ratio term obtained from the migration choice equation 22 . The selection term is statistically signi…cant, and the instrumented network size e¤ect shows no sizable variation.
Of course, the validity of the conclusions on the relevance of network e¤ects depends on the validity of the model on which the IV estimates are based. A test of overidentifying restrictions needs to be undertaken in order to check the reliability of the identi…cation strategy. Lung-Fei (1992) shows that the minimized distance for these estimators provides a test of overidentifying restrictions: the null of instrument exogeneity can not be rejected 23 .
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
It is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity exploiting the availability of repeated observations for each individual. Given that we dispose of data on both migrants and non migrants, a convenient way of extending the previous discussion to a panel data setting is to rede…ne the model as a multinomial one for the four possible status j, de…ned by the interaction of residential status (migrate to an urban destination or stay in Nang Rong) and enrollment choice (study or work): The fourth option (Stay and Work) is used as the reference category.
In this way, we are able to endogenize the location of residence decision with decisions in each period about going to school, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals.
I restrict the focus to a particularly convenient class of multinomial models, the mixed logit or logit Kernel model (Ben-Akiva et al. (2001), Prowse (2005) ). In this setting, individual i rationally chooses one of the four options j to maximize his payo¤ V in each period t:
Where X is the vector of controls, N t 1 is the network variable and the fourth option V i;4;t (Stay in Nang Rong and Work) is chosen as the reference category, according to which the parameters and in the …rst three equations are interpretable.
Individual i chooses alternative j at time t with the following probability:
The joint probability of the individual's observed sequence of choices is obtained by integrating w.r.t. to the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity F ( i ) :
Estimation is performed by maximum simulated likelihood. In order to understand the intuition behind this method, observe that the unconditional log-likelihood can be interpreted as an expected value:
Simulation methods proceed by sampling R times from the distribution of i and constructing P i ( r i ) for r = 1::::R: The individual simulated likelihood are simply obtained by averaging P i ( r i ) over the R draws from the distribution of i : By the SLLN, simulated maximum likelihood estimates converge almost surely to the true parameters as R ! 1 and N ! 1:
A variety of simulation methods exist for sampling from the distribution of i ; we here use Halton draws, which have been shown to provide an high level of accuracy for a relatively low 20 computational time (Train (2000) ) 24 . Results are displayed in table 7.
INSERT TABLE 7 "Mixed Logit estimation of Network e¤ects" HERE While no straightforward comparison is possible with previous models, new interesting insights emerge. The estimation is performed on the whole sample of migrants and non migrants, so to circumvent the problem of selection in migration choice. The …rst three columns (1) Coe¢ cients need to be interpreted with respect to the baseline alternative, staying in Nang Rong as a worker. For example, looking at the coe¢ cients for family wealth (proxied by the asset score), one can see that those studying after the age of 13 come from relatively wealthier families; those migrating to internal destinations for working have a less wealthy background with respect to those who stay and …nd an employment in their origin region.
Concerning the network e¤ect, there is evidence of a signi…cant impact of the migrant network size on preferences for employment or education of those leaving their village. The young with a larger network tend to migrate and start working more at destination, while they exhibit a lower preference for moving and studying in the city. We can consider a discrete change in the network size to have an intuition on the magnitude of this e¤ect: one standard deviation in the size of the network (an increase of 33,3 individuals present at destination) tends to increase the probability of choosing the option of migrating and working by 9,7%, while decreasing the probability of choosing to migrate and study by 15,5%, when these two options are evaluated with respect to the baseline choice of staying in the origin village to work. 25
Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of the results, we start by exploring whether the signi…cance of our regressor of interest is a¤ected by di¤erent speci…cation of the selection and instrumental variable models. Enriching the models with other covariates which are at the group level and time varying is a reasonable way to inspect the sensitiveness of the estimated network size e¤ect to di¤erent model speci…cations: we have thus tried to reestimate the models adding the mean education level of the network population as an additional regressor. As it can be seen in column 3 of table 5 for the selection model and in column 3 of table 6 for the instrumental variable model, 2 4 The model is estimated on STATA using the mixlogit routine developed by Hole (2007) . Another convenient estimator of the model is by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Similarities between the two methods are carefully explained by Train (2003) . .
2 5 This calculation is based on estimates from speci…cation 1. There is a signi…cant e¤ect of network size on the choice of studying rather than working while staying in Nang Rong; however, this estimated e¤ect is very small (one standard deviation change in network size a¤ecting the relative probability of studying at origin by 0,6%). the network size estimate is robust when controlling for this additional group characteristic.
One potential drawback to the application of the Heckman selection model is its sensitivity to the assumed parametric distribution of the unobservable error terms in the model. If the joint distribution of the error terms in equations (1) and (2) is misspeci…ed, the second-step parameter estimator will be inconsistent in general. Newey et al. (1990) conditions on a polynomial of the estimated probability of participation in a regression framework, in order to avoid to impose parametric forms on error distributions. This ‡exible function of the estimated probability approximates the unknown conditional expectation of the error term, just as the Mills ratio terms, which are functions of the probability of participation, represent the conditional expectation of the unobservable under the normality assumption. In column 4 of table 5, the selection model is semi-parametrically estimated in two steps as suggested by Newey et al. (1990) , using a quartic in the predicted probability of migration to approximate the true control function 26 : the coe¢ cient on the network size decreases in size, while its statistical signi…cance is not much altered 27 .
Angrist (2001) argues that the common use of parametric models overly complicates inference when the statistic of interest is causal e¤ects and suggests that linear approximation like standard 2SLS performs as well as parametric estimators in a labor-supply model. 28 In column 4 of table 5, we thus provide two stage least square estimates as an alternative to the instrumental variable probit model. The linear approximation yields results that are similar to the probit ones, con…rming that the signi…cance of network e¤ect seems robust to alternative parametric assumptions.
INSERT TABLE 8 "Additional Robustness Checks for Selection Model" and TABLE 9
"Additional Robustness Checks for IV Model" HERE.
Other robustness checks performed on the two models are presented in table 7 and table   8 . In column 2 of table 7, the selection model is re-estimated on a smaller sample, limiting the observation to the life histories of young individuals between the ages of 13 and 20. Again, the network size e¤ect is stable. In the third column of table 7 and in column 2 of table 8, migrants to the regional capital of Buriram are excluded from the sample: those migrating to this city might face a di¤erent assimilation process, given closeness and lower ethnical diversity of this destination with respect to Nang Rong villages. In both models, the estimates of network e¤ects seems only marginally a¤ected by this change in the relevant sample. Finally, in column 3 of table 8, we check whether the instrumental variable model results are sensitive to the choice of a speci…c set of instrument. The model is re-estimated with a weaker …rst stage regression, including only the military draft as instrumental variable. Statistically signi…cance of the network size does not seem to be largely a¤ected.
Conclusions
Economic integration and modernization bene…t to a di¤erent extent individuals who are born in di¤erent regions: in developing countries, divides between enlocked rural regions and dynamic urban poles have tended to widen in the last decades, and so location of birth persist to be an important predictor of economic opportunities. Di¤erent economic models have illustrated how this opportunity gap is destined to shrink when mobility is not constrained by high migration costs. However, this is clearly true only if labor markets at destination do not segmentate in niches separating migrants from native, and if migrants are perceived and behave at destination labor market as the natives do. What we observe in reality is that migrants tend to concentrate in enclaves at destination, and networks as informal institutions have an important role in smoothing assimilation to urban life, either by promoting solidarity and risk sharing among their members, either by easing employment matching. In this paper, we looked at the dynamic implications of the strong ties linking young migrants to their own community of origin: if networks channel career choices so that individuals fail to take full advantage of the economic opportunities o¤ered by the city, can we suspect dynamic ine¢ ciencies and low upward mobility to arise as a consequence of networking?
We observe an high reliance on community support by Thai internal migrants; the data also show a very low propensity of young migrants to invest in acquiring higher education.
Assuming that higher and technical education is needed for talented individuals to reap the full opportunities of booming cities, we have argued that a simple test of network e¤ects on economic mobility can be undertaken by regressing network size (as a proxy for density of the community ties and for the probability that networks are active and e¤ective) on the probability of the young to be enrolled as student at destination. In practice, empirical analysis of network e¤ects is challenging, as potential selection and simultaneity bias need to be accounted for.
We have proposed three di¤erent estimation framework in order to check the consistency of results, exploiting the uniqueness of a dataset which accurately describes migration and career choices of both stayers and movers 29 . We have …rst addressed the issue of selectivity of the migrants sample for which network e¤ects are estimated, aggregating information on migrants and non migrants in order to correct for the non-random allocation of young people growing in a setting with dense migration history. Secondly, we have used instrumental variable estimation as an attempt to verify that the negative correlation between network size and young schooling choice is not spouriously determined by unobservable characteristics or shocks a¤ecting either village migration and human capital accumulation at destination. Finally, we remarked that unobserved preferences matter in explaining migration behaviour and in determining perceived opportunity costs of higher schooling; exploiting the availability of repeated choices for migrants and non migrants, we have modelled the simultaneous schooling and migration decision using a multinomial mixed logit formulation which allows a straightforward accounting of individual heterogeneity.
The three models suggest that a statistically signi…cant negative relation links young migrants' schooling decision with the size of the network of co-villagers present at destination.
Even if the negative network externality is small in this sample, the paper provides evidence of a channel which can lead to persistence of low educational attainment for those born in rural areas. This …nding has important implications for policies attempting to rise schooling participation: if the story presented in this paper is correct, young migrants integrated in su¢ ciently large enclaves perceive an higher opportunity cost of schooling and tend to join the labor force earlier. Since migrant networks are not likely to lose importance as rural urban integration proceeds, there is the need to study better why the clustering in solidal networks might undermine investment in education at destination.
Two main explanations should be considered. A …rst possible explanation link the migrant network size with the development of asymmetric or strati…ed communities within the city.
Given an initial disadvantage with respect to natives, young migrants end up living in less dynamic neighborhood. Labor market institutions speci…c to these heterogenous communities -and in particular the word-of-mouth mode of dissemination of information about scarse job opportunities -also play a role, as individuals embedded in low skill networks develop lower expected returns to high education acquisition (Anderberg & Andersson (2007) ). According to the second explanation, the community e¤ectively discourages the acquisition of higher education by their members, as this behaviour is perceived as a deviation and sanctioned.
A social planner interested in raising educational achievements of the young migrants should sensibly think about measures a¤ecting the community evaluation of higher schooling, such as reserving a preferential access of migrants to training and matching programs granting access to remurative, high skill jobs. It might also be worth experimenting policy measures reducing the dependency of young individuals on support of their own origin community (for example, scholarship schemes involving the phisical deplacement of the young to neighborhoods where concentration of their co-villagers is lower 30 ).
What is valid for internal migration is potentially even more valid for international migration: consider that as the cost of migration and assimilation rise, so the value attached by the individual to partecipation in his community group rises.
Finally, further research is warranted to extend the analysis of migrant network e¤ects on dimensions of upward mobility other than schooling, such as the relative participation of those with a migratory history to non traditional employment sectors.
Appendix
We here provide the proof for proposition 1 of section 2, following closely the original model of Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008) . Proposition 1 says that an initial inequality in the allocation of skills between groups can not be reversed in equilibrium. The proof is based on the de…nition of competitive equilibrium as an allocation of skill across groups satisfying equations (1)- (4), and the result follows from the assumed complementarity of low and high skill labor in the process of production. Assume that the proportion of skilled in two groups at the initial period is given by
Then, by equations (1) and (2), the proportion of skilled in the initial period in the overall economy, s o ; and in each group network, (L N 0 ; L M 0 ) 2 [0; 1] 2 ; are uniquely de…ned. De…ne the function ' as follows:
Note that '(s) is bounded between 0 and 1, and strictly decreasing, as '(0) = 1 and '(1) = 0:
; there exists a unique value of s such that s='(s):From equation (1) and equation (4), s 1 must satisfy s 1 = '(s 1 ) in equilibrium, so s 1 is uniquely de…ned. This extends logically to the pair (s N 1 ; s M 1 ); which is also uniquely de…ned from (4). Having proven uniqueness, an initial situation of inequality s N 0 > s M 0 will persist at any t given the construction of L V in (2), the dynamics in (4) and the fact that the threshold e a is decreasing in network quality L V :
This completes the proof for proposition 1.
Is this conclusion valid asymptotically? In other words, we wonder whether convergence can be achieved as t ! 1 given an initial condition of disequality. De…ne a competitive equilibrium as a steady state if (s N 0 ; s M 0 ) = (s N t ; s M t ) for all t. Steady states are symmetric if the two groups have a common skill share, s N t = s M t At any symmetric steady state, the common skill share s t must solve
Since costs of training are bounded and bene…ts goes to in…nite as s ! 0; everyone gets trained when s ! 0;i.e. lim s!0 (s) = 0: Samely, lim s!0 (s) = 0; as (1) = 0:
Thus, there must exist at least one symmetric steady state. There will be only one symmetric steady state if e a( (s); s) is strictly increasing in s at any such state, or
where e a 1 and e a 2 are partial derivatives. The condition simply says that as s rises, the threshold raises too as the wage gap shrinks: this must be the case if the reduction in cost due to the externality is not high enough to compensate the e¤ect of a reduction in the bene…t of training (the wage gap) as s rises. Is this unique steady state stable? This depends on the level 29 of segregation, as it is shown now. Rewrite (4) as a recursive system:
Assume that the externality e¤ect is not too small:
The stability of the symmetric steady state can be de…ned by examining the eigenvalues of the Jacobian:
By some manipulations from (21), Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2008) show that these eigenvalues are equal to: .58 Robust standard errors in bracket, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% Note: Semi-parametric in column 4 refers to the estimation method suggested in Newey et al.(1990) , and use a qaurtic In the predicted probability of migration estimated as a first stage. 0.34 Robust standard errors in bracket, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% Note: The estimation method is in all regression except column (4) is the Newey (1987) Amemiya (1978) instrumental variable probit. Robust standard errors in brackets, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%
